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The Information Content of Interim Report 
in A-share Market of China 
Abstract 
This study empirically investigates three research issues related to the information 
content of interim report by listed Chinese firms with A-shares: (1) whether interim 
.• report is useful to investors in valuation decisions, (2) whether the market responds to 
interim earnings when they are disclosed again as part of annual earnings at annual 
earnings announcement, and (3) whether auditing affects the information content of 
interim report and whether the market responds differently to voluntary and mandatory 
auditing and to different audit opinions. 
The sample consists of 2,330 interim reports released during 1996 to 1999. I find 
that good news arrives to the market earlier than bad news. Both long-term association 
and short-term event study indicate that the market responds significantly to interim 
earnings when first released. Moreover, the market does not react to interim earnings 
when they are released again as part of annual earnings, indicating that investors have 
already incorporated such information into their expectation of annual earnings prior to 
annual earnings release. Finally, there is evidence that auditing adds to the credibility of 
interim earnings. Investors rely more on audited interim reports, especially those audited 
voluntarily. Interim reports with unqualified opinions are more credible than those with 
modified opinions. 
Empirically examining the value relevance of information captured by interim 
report, this study extends prior research on interim report to an emerging market and 
enriches Chinese capital market research. It provides evidence that security prices 
respond to interim earnings announcement but do not react to such information again at 
annual report release. Therefore, the A-share market is reasonably efficient with regard to 
the release of interim information. Moreover, it documents the effect of auditing on the 
I information content of interim data. Although auditing of interim report is not mandatory, 
it enhances the information content of interim report, especially voluntary auditing. 
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The Information Content of Interim Report 
in A-share Market of China 
7. Introduction 
The classic study by Ball and Brown [1968] marks the beginning of scientific 
market study in accounting research. Since then there has been extensive empirical 
•'evidence that significant correlation exists between accounting information and stock 
returns in an efficient capital market. Among research on the market valuation of 
accounting information, examination of earnings information content is an important part. 
From both long-term and event study perspectives, stock prices are associated with 
earnings and react significantly to earnings announcement. However, prior research 
documents that the explanatory power of annual earnings to stock returns tends to be low, 
no higher than 10% on average. Several explanations have been proposed, one of which 
is the availability of other more timely information channels. (Ball and Brown [1968], 
Beaver, Clark and Wright [1979], Lev [1989], Easton and Harris [1991], Ball and Kothari 
[1991], Strong [1993]). For example, Ball and Brown [1968] suggest that much of the 
information content in annual earnings has been pre-empted by more prompt media, 
including interim report. Therefore the first objective of this paper is to examine whether 
interim report captures part of annual earnings prior to annual report release by providing 
useful information for investors in their valuation decisions, in the case of China's A-
share market. — 
In China, little firm-specific information other than interim report is available 
prior to the annual report release for investors to make accurate forecasts for future 
‘ annual earnings. Most listed Chinese firms fulfill only the minimum disclosure 
requirements mandated by the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) (Haw, 
Qi and Wu [2000]). There exists little pre-disclosure information such as earnings 
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forecasts or preliminary earnings reports. The lack of publicly available timely 
disclosures leads to asymmetrical information between individual and institutional 
investors, which may yield chance of abnormal returns for the latter. The second 
objective of this study is to investigate whether interim report in China is useful to "help 
predict the outcome which ultimately appears on the annual report" (Brown and Kennelly 
[1972]), and thus alleviate information asymmetry in China's A-share market. 
Third, in the 1990's, Chinese capital market studies have accumulated empirical 
evidence on the market valuation of accounting information under the Chinese GAAP, 
International Accounting Standards and Hong Kong GAAP (Aharony, Lee and Wong 
[1997]; Haw, Qi and Wu [1998] and [1999]; Chen, Gul and Su [1999]). Up to now, 
however, no Chinese market research has investigated whether interim report in China 
adds information content to annual report for investors. Haw, Qi and Wu [2000] argue 
that, in China, "it is not mandatory that interim report be audited. As a result, the annual 
report has become the most significant and reliable source of information". To test 
whether this reasoning holds, this study will examine the effect of auditing on the value 
relevance of interim data by investigating whether the market responds differently to 
audited and unaudited interim reports. Moreover, auditing is further disaggregated into 
voluntary and mandatory auditing, auditing with various reasons and auditing with 
different audit opiiiions\ 
The sample of this study consists of 2,330 firm years of interim reports during 
1996 to 1999. I find that good news arrives to the market earlier than bad news. The 
timeliness of interim reporting can help investors anticipate the news, especially bad 
, 1 Although auditing on interim report is not mandatory, it is required for firms under the following 
situations: (1) Special Treatment (ST) firms, (2) firms who will offer stock rights in the second half of 
the fiscal year, (3) firms who will transfer current profits to earnings surplus, (4) firms who will 
distribute interim stock dividends or cash dividends in the second half of the fiscal year, and (5) other 
cases specified by the CSRC. Some firms also voluntarily have interim report audited. 
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news. Both long-term and event studies indicate that the market responds significantly to 
interim earnings when first released. Moreover, the market does not react to interim 
earnings when they are released again as part of annual earnings. Comparison of different 
expectation models of annual earnings demonstrates that investors use interim earnings to 
forecast annual earnings. This result serves as evidence on investor sophistication and 
market efficiency. Finally, this study provides evidence that auditing adds to the 
•• credibility of interim earnings. Investors rely more on audited interim reports, especially 
those audited voluntarily. Interim reports with unqualified opinions are more credible 
than those with modified opinions. On the whole, results in this Chinese market study 
are consistent with prior studies on the value-relevance of interim report, timeliness of 
earnings reporting，and the effect of auditing on earnings credibility. 
Empirically examining the value-relevance of information captured by interim 
report, this study extends prior research on interim report to an emerging market and 
enriches Chinese capital market research. It provides evidence that security prices 
respond to earnings announcement but do not react to such information again at annual 
report release, therefore the A-share market is reasonably efficient with regard to the 
release of interim information. Moreover, it documents the effect of auditing on the 
information content of interim data. Although auditing of interim report is not mandatory, 
it enhances the information content of interim report, especially voluntary auditing. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides background of the 
study. Section 3 reviews prior literature. Section 4 discusses hypotheses and research 
design. Section 5 describes sample and variables. Section 6 presents empirical results. 




2JThe Chinese Capital Market 
Since the late 1970s, China has experienced the economic reform transforming 
State Owned Enterprises (SOE) from state-planned production units to independent 
business enterprises. To facilitate SOE reform and relieve SOEs from capital shortage, 
the PRC government started to allow Chinese enterprises to raise capital from stock 
markets in the mid 1980s, marking the reactivation of Chinese stock market. From then 
on, SOEs were incorporated through selling shares to employees and other SOEs, and the 
shares were traded in the over-the-counter (OTC) markets. In 1990 and 1991, Shanghai 
Stock Exchange (SHSE) and Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) were established 
respectively. In October of 1992, the State Council Securities Commission (SCSC) and 
the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) were established as stock market 
regulatory institutions. The SCSC was the state authority responsible for exercising 
centralized market regulation. The CSRC was the SCSCs executive branch responsible 
for conducting supervision and regulation of the stock markets. In April 1998，the SCSC 
was merged into the CSRC, which has since been under the direct control of the State 
Council. This has led to a centralized securities supervisory system. The A-share market 
has been growing very rapidly, from 13 listed firms in 1991 to 949 firms at the end of 
19992. During the same period, the market capitalization increased from 10.9 billion 
RMB to 2647.1 billion RMB, at an average annual growth rate of 188% (See Table 1 ). 
Primarily as a result of China's transition from a planned economy to a market 
economy, accounting in the People's Republic of China has undergone dramatic changes 
during the past 25 years. The old accounting system focused on providing information for 
a state-planned economy. As Chinese companies began to seek capital in capital markets, 
2 A-shares are traded among domestic investors and B-shares or H-shares are limited to foreign investors. 
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a new accounting system was needed to meet the demands of external users of accounting 
information such as lenders, outside shareholders, investment bankers and financial 
analysts (Tang and Pacter [2000]). In 1990，the Ministry of Finance (MOF) began to 
develop a new set of accounting standards for investor and creditor reporting. The 
Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises in 1993 marked the first radical change in 
Chinese Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) in the direction of 
‘• International Accounting Standards. To date, 40 exposure drafts of proposed standards 
have been issued by the MOF, 10 of which have been promugated. 
Financial Statements of listed firms are prepared under the Chinese GAAP, and 
listed firms have to follow public disclosure standards. The current public disclosure 
system mainly consists of: (1)."Provisional Regulations on Administration of Security 
Issuance and Trading" by the State Council in 1993，(2)."Detailed Rules for Information 
Disclosure for Listed Chinese Companies" CSRC in 1993, (3)."Standards for the Content 
and Format of Information Disclosure of Listed Chinese Companies" by the CSRC in 
‘ 1997, which was revised in 1998，and (4) Security Law in 1999^ In addition, the CSRC 
also promulgates detailed disclosure standards. Mandatory disclosure information 
includes prospectus, listing announcements, periodical financial statements (interim and 
annual), and temporary announcements for significant events such as merger and 
acquisition. 
The development of the market economy and the reactivation of the stock market 
demanded external accounting. The MOF created the Chinese Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (CICPA) in 1988. Professional CPA firms have been established since the 
1980s', including joint ventures with the Big Five. CPA professional exam has been held 
. once per year since 1992. The CPA law came into effect in 1995 and the MOF 
3 http://www.csrc.aov.en/CSRCsite (CSRC regulations) ； http:"cfi.net.cn/law/ (Security Law) 
8 
會 
promulgated 3 batches of 27 detailed Independent Auditing Standards from 1996 to 1999. 
The MOF and the CICPA also undertook a campaign to improve CPA qualification and 
ethics through practice review of CPA firms. Meanwhile, China's accounting 
environment has been characterized by a lack of independent/professional auditing 
(Xiang [1998]). The government used to own both audit firms and listed companies they 
audited, which substantially hindered independence of audit practice. Anyhow, DeFond, 
Wong and Li [2000] find evidence for increased auditor independence with the 
implementation of new detailed Independent Auditing Standards since 1996. 
Some problems exist in the Chinese stock market. First of all, reactivation the 
stock market was initially intended to serve the SOE reform, and thus only SOEs had the 
privileged access to the resources of the stock market, especially those in non-profitable 
infrastructure industries. As a result, the profitability of Chinese capital listed firms 
remains low. Moreover, despite the efforts in separating the ownership and management 
of SOEs, Chinese A-share firms are in fact under government control, with the chairman 
of board and CEO assigned by the government. Since this is not a repeated but a once-
and-forever game, reputation is not a concern to CEOs of Chinese listed firms. Therefore, 
listed SOEs are irresponsible for investors in using raised capital and disclosing firm 
performance(W.Y., Zhang [2000]). On the other hand, current disclosure regulations are 
deficient (Xiao [1999]). The voice of individual investors is almost beyond hearing, and 
there are few information channels like earnings forecasts by financial analysts or by 
news media (Haw, Qi and Wu [2000]). Institutional investors have asymmetrically more 
mformation than individual investors and huge amounts of capital to manipulate stock 
prices of targeted firms, which yields high abnormal returns (Z.Q., Zhang [2000]). 
, In such an environment, in order to monitor listed SOEs and to eliminate high 
abnormal returns under information asymmetry, it is essential to further standardize the 
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disclosure and dissemination of financial information in the developing Chinese market. 
At the same time, auditing needs to play its role of enhancing the reliability of financial 
disclosures so as to safeguard the interests of the state and external investors (Tang, 
Chow and Lau [1999]). 
2.2 Interim Report 
In mature markets，interim reports (including quarterly and semi-annual reports) 
have been mandatory since the 1960s. Advocates claim that the lack of regular reports on 
the performance of the company might result in violent fluctuation in price. Interim 
reporting is therefore necessary because it provides regular information to shareholders 
regarding the progress of business so that they are less likely to be surprised by 
unexpected losses. 
In China, interim report (semi-annual) has been required since 1994 but the 
detailed regulations were not available until the CSRC released 'The Third Rule of 
Listed Companies' Information Disclosure: Interim Reporting" in 1996. It set standards — 
for the content and format of semi-annual interim report, which is mandated for listed 
firms and must be announced before August 31 of each fiscal year. The CSRC further 
revised the regulation on interim report in 1998. Although auditing on interim report is 
not mandatory, it is required for firms under the following situations: (1) Special 
Treatment* (ST) firms, (2) firms who will offer stock rights in the second half of the 
fiscal year，(3) firms who will transfer current profits to earnings surplus, (4) firms who 
will distribute interim stock dividends or cash dividends in the second half of the fiscal 
year, and (5) other cases specified by the CSRC. Some firms also voluntarily have 
’ interim report audited. 
4 ST firms are those who have experienced losses for continuously 3 years and are on the edge of delisiting. 
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3. Literature Review 
3.1. Prior Studies on Earnings Information Content 
In the past thirty years, assessing the usefulness of earnings to investors has been 
a major research effort in market studies. Market-based accounting research obtains its 
impetus from the concept of informationally efficient capital markets (Ball and Brown 
[1968], Fama and French [1992]). Under the hypothesis of efficient market, "if 
information is useful in forming capital asset prices, then the market will adjust asset 
prices to that information quickly，,(Ball and Brown [1968]). Among all the accounting 
information provided in financial statements, earnings are widely believed by researchers 
and practitioners to be the premier information item, as a base for predicting future cash 
flows and market value of a firm. Prices act as if accounting earnings are an important 
source of information, but only one of many sources (Beaver [1981]). Olson [1995] 
provides theoretical ground for changes in current capital market research by structuring 
the relations of accounting data and firm value in a simple and plausible way. 
Usefulness of earnings has been examined by sign test and magnitude test, and 
then by miming regression of stock returns on earnings and/or unexpected earnings, in 
both long-term study and short-window event study. For return-earnings correlation, the 
significance of Earnings Response Coefficient (ERC) and the adjusted R^ act as 
measures of information contribution of earnings to investors. Both level and change 
variables of earnings are found to play a role in security valuation. (Beaver, Clarke and 
Wright [1979]，Brown and KenneUy [1972], Collins and Kothari [1989], Easton and 
Harris [1991], Strong [1993]) 
, Earnings Response Coefficient (ERC) acts as a measure of the extent to which 
new earnings information is capitalized in the stock price, and much literature has 
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focused on the determinants ofERC. Current evidence indicates that ERC varies with the 
quality of earnings, the predictability of earnings, the persistence of earnings, the 
security's covariation with the market return, growth opportunity of the firm and the 
industry membership (Easton and Zmijewski [1989], Collins and Kothari [1989], Biddle, 
Seow and Siegel [1995], Teoh and Wong [1993]). 
However, the explanatory power of how much stock price variation is explained 
by earnings is low, usually no higher than 10%. A 皿mber of non-mutually exclusive 
explanations have been advanced for these disappointing results, such as poor 
specification of the estimating equation, poor information quality of reported earnings 
because of biases introduced by accounting measurement and earnings management, 
inappropriate choice of assumed proxy for expected earnings, and the availability of more 
timely value-relevant information sources. (Ball and Brown [1968], Beaver, et al. [1979], 
Lev [1989], Strong and Walker [1993]) 
Studies on the timing pattern of annual and interim earnings releases are closely 
related to research on earnings information content. It is found that announcements of 
good news are accelerated while announcements of bad news are delayed (Kross and 
Schroeder [1984]). Meanwhile, early announcements exhibit statistically significantly 
higher abnormal returns around announcement date than late announcements, controlling 
for earnings forecast error (Chambers and Panman [1984]). Under shareholder theory, 
the management tends to accelerate the announcement of good news and delay the 
release of bad news to reinforce (lessen) market responses to good (bad) news (Bowen, 
Shevlin and Shores [1992]). Another explanation is internal reporting theory, which 
proposes that the management tends to delay bad news in order to get the time to be 
� prepared for pressure from internal supervision (Kross [1982]). 
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3.2, Prior Studies on Interim Report 
Around the 1970s and 1980s, interim report received attention from both 
professional accountants and academics. Much has been written of the nature and the 
principles underlying interim reporting (e.g. Green [1964], Rappaport [1966], Edwards et 
al [1972]), the problems of interim reporting for a seasonal business (Bollum [1973], 
BoUum and Weygandt [1972]), the effect of alternative measurement techniques 
(Fogelberg [1971], Hopwood and Newbold [1985]), qualitative evaluation of interim 
report (Robb [1980]), and the information content of interim report (May [1971], Brown 
and Kennelly [1972], Foster [1977], Foster, Olsen and Shevlin [1984]). 
As for the information content of interim report, there exists evidence for equal 
market impact of interim report and annual report, as well as evidence of greater 
predictive ability gained by shortening the financial reporting period (May [1971], Brown 
and Kennelly [1972], Foster [1977]). For example, Brown and Kennelly [1972] use the 
approach initiated by Ball and Brown [1968] to assess the information content of 
quarterly reports. They find that, (1) information in quarterly earnings reports is useful in 
that it can be used to predict aggregate abnormal rates of return, and (2) disaggregation of 
annual earnings into its quarterly components improves the predictive ability of the 
series. Another example is Foster [1977]. He finds similar results that quarterly reports 
have information content in forecasting future values of earnings. He also ducuments 
significant market reaction to interim accounting data. Also, May [1971] examines the 
influence of quarterly earnings announcements on investor decisions as reflected in 
common stock price changes with the methodology from Ball and Brown [1968] and 
Beaver, Clarke and Wright [1979]. He documents that stock price variability at the time 
of interim announcements differs from that in non-announcement periods, and concludes 
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that quarterly accounting information is useful to investors as reflected in market price 
changes. So that improvement in the quality of quarterly data will help investors make 
annual earnings forecast and rational valuation decisions. Meanwhile, he finds that the 
price responses to quarterly data are less than that to annual data, although not 
significantly less. 
Since there is no requirement on the auditing of interim data in the US, literature 
, o n the auditing of interim earnings is limited only to the debates in 1970s' on whether the 
SEC should mandate interim auditing under benefit-cost analysis. Some studies examine 
the effect of auditor involvement on the quality of interim earnings. For example, Givoly, 
Ronen and Schiff [1978] compare an auditor-reviewed group against a non-reviewed 
group and find no large systematic difference in the reliability of interim report. Using 
the similar qualitative approach on a different sample, Alford and Edmonds [1981] 
duplicate Givoly, Ronen and Schiff [1978] and find consistent results. However, auditor 
review is different from auditing in terms of precision and credibility, and the impact of 
auditing on the quality of interim report remains as an empirical issue. 
The literature on the effect of auditing on annual earnings is also relevant to this 
study. Theoretically, investors' response to an earnings surprise is related to the perceived 
precision of earnings report. There are theoretical proposition and empirical evidence that 
the ERC varies with the quality of earnings (Holthausen and Verrecchia [1988], Teoh and 
Wong [1993]). Hence, if audited earnings are perceived to be more credible, they should 
have a greater effect on investors' valuation of the firm when the reported numbers more 
accurately reflect true economic value, implying higher ERC for audited reports. Teoh 
and Wong [1993] test the joint hypothesis that investors perceive audited earnings as 
» 
more credible by making larger response and that the ERC of earnings audited by Big 
Eight is higher than that of earnings audited by Non-Big Eight. They find that auditing 
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enhances the precision of earnings and generates higher ERC for Big Eight audited firms 
than for Non-Big Eight audited firms. 
3,3,Prior Studies of Earnings Usefulness in the Chinese market 
Empirical research has provided evidence that the Chinese capital market is 
above weak form efficiency and approaching semi-strong efficiency (Yu [1994], Song 
and Jin [1995], Wu [1995], Gao [1996], Fan and Zhang [1998]). Moreover, annual 
earnings have been found to be value-relevant in that the market reacts to earnings 
announcements (Haw, Qi and Wu [1998] and [1999]; Abdel-khalik, Wong and Wu 
[1999]). For example, value-relevance of annual earnings in the Chinese capital market in 
the case of A, B and H shares has been documented. Haw, Qi and Wu [1998] and [1999] 
find that there exists significant market valuation of annual earnings by return-earnings 
long-term association and event study methodology in A, B and H share markets. 
Besides, they find the explanatory power of earnings to return is higher in the Chinese 
market than that in mature markets. Using an event-study approach, Abdel-khalik, Wong 
and Wu [1999] find that accounting earnings and unexpected returns are correlated for A-
shares but not for B-shares, possibly due to the lack of active trading in B-share market. 
Haw, Qi and Wu [2000] argue that the annual report is the most significant and reliable 
source of information on listed Chinese firms for investors, because it is not mandatory 
that interim report be audited. 
As for the timeliness of financial reporting, Haw, Qi and Wu [2000] document 
that there exists systematic and predictable timing pattern of annual earnings 
announcements in the Chinese market for the annual data during 1995 to 1998. But there 
has not been any empirical evidence of the same pattern for interim earnings in China. 
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4.Hypotheses and Research Design 
This section discusses the methods designed to answer the three questions: (1) 
whether interim report is useful to investors in valuation decisions, (2) whether the 
market responds to interim earnings when they are disclosed again as part of annual 
earnings at annual report release, and (3) whether auditing affects the information content 
of interim report and whether the market responds differently to voluntary and mandatory 
auditing and to different audit opinions. 
4.1 Value Relevance of Interim Earnings 
Hypothesis 1: There exists significantly positive correlation between security returns 
and interim earnings in the long-term horizon. 
Hypothesis 2: The market reacts to interim report release in a short window centered 
around the announcement date. 
For the informativeness of interim report of A-share firms in China, Hypothesis 1 
examines the return-earnings relationship by cross-sectional regressions in a four-month 
horizon. Hypothesis 2 investigates market reaction to interim report announcement in a 
three-day event window. Further, market valuation of interim earnings is investigated for 
sub-samples of good-bad news, profitable-loss firms, and different report lags, in an 
event study methodology. 
The first approach to evaluating the value-relevance of interim report is to 
, cons ide r the long-term association between four-month aggregate market-adjusted return 
(May 1 to August 31) and interim earnings, . Haw, Qi and Wu [1999] calculate 
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the twelve-month market-adjusted return from May 1 of the current year to the next April 
30 because Chinese listed firms file their annual reports within four months from the 
fiscal year end of December 31. Interim reports arrive to the market in July and August. 
The accumulation period of market-adjusted return to interim earnings starts from May 1 
(the first day after annual report release), and ends on August 31 (the last day of interim 
report release) to capture market responses to interim report release. In compounding 
aggregate return, market wide change is controlled by adjusting raw returns with equally 
weighted market return. It is expected that interim earnings are associated with four-
month aggregate market-adjusted return. This hypothesis is tested with the regression 
below (subscripts i and t are omitted): 
RET = a ,+P,EARN'- ' ^ s (1) 
in which 
RET = 4-month market-adjusted rate of returns beginning from May 1 to August 
31，adjusted for dividends and stock rights, 
EARN '^^  = earnings of the first half fiscal year contained in interim report, deflated 
by the market value at the beginning of May in year t, 
s = a random error term. 
The value-relevance of EARN“ depends on whether p�is significantly positive 
in Model 1. 
Although long-term return-earnings association provides evidence of association 
between price and earnings information, it is not clear whether this is investors' reaction 
to interim earnings release or simply an aggregate effect of market reaction to other more 
timely information sources. Event study can resolve this issue by focusing on whether 
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price reacts to interim earnings in the short event window surrounding interim report 
announcement date. If price reaction is significant to the release of interim earnings, then 
it can be inferred that interim report is value-relevant to investors. At interim report 
release, the unexpected earnings are the surprise to the market and the stock market is 
expected to react to the surprise in the event window. In Model 2, the dependent variable 
of interest is three-day cumulative abnormal return. Daily abnormal return is computed 
by market-adjusted return on a three-day event window around interim report release 
from 1996 to 1999. The price reaction to interim earnings information is assessed by 
testing whether ERC is significantly positive in the following regression (subscripts i and 
t are omitted): 
CAR' = a�+ PY碰RN�-�+ s (2) 
in which 
CAR! = 3-day market-adjusted cumulative abnormal rate of returns siuTOunding the 
interim report amiomicement date, adjusted for dividends and stock rights, 
AEARN'-' = EARN'-' - EARN):;，deflated by the market value at the beginning of the 
3-day event window surrounding the interim report announcement date, 
s = a random error term. 
In addition, for the event study, market valuation of earnings information is 
compared between several subgroups: good news versus bad news, profitable versus loss 




4.2 Market Response to Interim Earnings At Annual Earnings 
Announcement 
Hypothesis 3: At annual earnings announcement, the market reacts only to earnings in 
the second half year. 
Hypothesis 3 investigates how the market responds to earnings of the first six 
months when they are disclosed again as part of annual earnings in annual report. When 
annual report of year t arrives to the market during January to April in year t+1, interim 
earnings for the first half of the fiscal year are included as part of the annual earnings. 
Interim earnings are stale information and therefore the market should only reacts to 
earnings in the second half-year. In an event study setting, Model 3 first examines market 
reaction to unexpected annual earnings. Then, in Model 4, annual earnings are 
disaggregated into earnings of the first half year and that of the second half. The 
coefficient of in Model 3 is expected to be significantly positive. If the coefficient of 
AE^题7-12 jg significantly positive while that of AEARN" is not in Model 4，it indicates 
that AEARN^'^has been used by the market and turned into stale information before the 
annual report release. Therefore, the market responds only to the new information in 
To further investigate how investors use the information in interim earnings to 
forecast annual earnings, market reactions to three different proxies of unexpected 
annual earnings are examined. Model 3 adopts the random walk model, which assumes 
the only useful information to forecast annual earnings of year t is the annual earnings of 
� year t-1 (UE'= EARN]-'"- - EARN二之=A EARN). Model 4 allows for the possibility 
that investors use unexpected interim earnings, together with annual earnings of year t-1, 
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to forecast annual earnings of year t {UE^ = 
EARN: - (EARNj：^ + /SEARN]'') = AEARN广-AEARN” = AEARN). On the 
other hand, investors may assume that investors anticipate the same rate of growth for 
interim and annual earnings as shown in Model 5 (UE^ = 
EARN]-'' - EARN]：^ * (1 + AEABN” / EARN)-�).por example, if the interim earnings 
for year t are 10% higher than that of year t-1, investors anticipate that annual earnings 
of year t will also rise by approximately 10% over that of year t-1. 
CARA = a , + y^ i 編 题 1-12 (3) 
CARA =a,+ AEARN'-' + fi^AEARN'-'^ + s (4) 
CARA = «0 + A [ e a r n 广 - * (1 + AEARN” / EARN):; + f (5) 
where 
CARA = 3-day market-adjusted cumulative abnormal rate of returns surrounding 
the annual report announcement date, adjusted for dividends and 
stock rights, 
EARNm = annual earnings of year t, deflated by the market value at the beginning of 
the 3-day event window surrounding the annual report announcement date, 
AEARN'-'^ = EARN]-''' - EARN):?，deflated by the market value at the begimiing of the 
3-day event window surrounding the annual report announcement date, 
AEARN 1-6 = EARN” — EARN二'，deflated by the market value at the begimiing of the 
3-day event window surrounding the annual report announcement date, 
‘ AEARN= EARN]-''- - EARN]:?，deflated by the market value at the beginning of 
the 3-day event window surrounding the annual report announcement date, 
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s = a random error term 
The comparison of these regression results will reveal whether interim earnings 
are useful and which forecast model is the best for annual earnings. 
4.3 Auditing and Information Content of Interim Report 
Hypothesis 4: Investors rely more on audited interim reports. 
This section examines the impact of auditing on the information content of 
interim report. To evaluate whether auditing improves information content of interim 
reporting to investors, a dummy variable is employed in both, long window and event 
study models to control for the effect of auditing (subscripts i and t are omitted): 
RET = a�+ + p^DA + P^EARN'-" *DA + £ (6) 
CAR!=仅。+ + PiDA + Pi^EARN“ *DA + £ (7) 
where 
RET = 4-month market-adjusted rate of return beginning from May 1 to August 
31，adjusted for dividends and stock rights, 
EARN“ = earnings of the first half fiscal year contained in interim report, deflated by 
the market value at the beginning of May in year t, 
CARi = 3-day market-adjusted cumulative abnormal rate of returns surrounding the 
interim report announcement date, adjusted for dividends and stock rights, 
A EARN�EARN” - EARN):;, deflated by the market value at the beginning of the 
� 3-day event window surrounding interim report announcement date, 
DA = a dummy variable that equals 1 for audited firms, and 0 otherwise, 
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£ = a random error term. 
If coefficients of the interaction terms between earnings and the dummy variable 
of auditing (DA) are significantly positive, then earnings response coefficients (ERC) are 
higher for audited earnings than for otherwise, indicating that investors rely more on 
audited interim reports. 
. Since the auditing of interim report is not mandatory except for firms under 
special circumstances, the inclusion of the dummy variable for auditing (DA) cannot 
fully reveal whether stock prices respond differently to auditing under different reasons. 
The CSRC mandates auditing of interim report for Special Treatment (ST) firms and 
firms who will offer stock rights，transfer current profits to earnings surplus, or distribute 
interim stock dividends or cash dividends in the second half of the fiscal year. Besides, 
when necessary, the CSRC also makes case-by-case decisions on whether the interim 
report of a firm needs to be audited. Meanwhile, a sub-sample of firms voluntarily have 
their interim reports audited. To study to compare the effect of mandatory and voluntary 
auditing and the effect of different mandatory auditing reasons on interim report, reasons 
for auditing are hand collected from the Disclosure of Material Events section in interim 
reports. DA is then further disaggregated into voluntary auditing (VDA) and mandatory 
auditing (MDA). If coefficients of interaction terms between earnings variables and 
VDA/MDA are significantly positive, then voluntarily/compulsorily audited interim 
reports have incremental information to investors than otherwise. 
Moreover, further analysis is conducted to classiiy mandatory auditing reasons 
into DA ,^ DA: and DA^ as reported in Panel C to E in Table 2. DA^  stands for auditing 
, b e c a u s e of events signaling good news, such as rights offer , transfer of current profits to 
earnings surplus, or distribution of interim stock dividends or cash dividends in the 
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second half of the fiscal year. DA^ is the dummy variable for special treatment that 
signals bad news. DA^ is the dummy variable for other reasons for mandatory auditing 
where good and bad news are mixed together. 
In addition, audit opinions are hand collected firm by firm and included as a 
dummy variable in regressions to examine their effect on the information content of 
interim earnings. 
5, Sample Description 
The sample consists of all listed firms with A-shares from 1996 to 1999 with 
related data available. Interim earnings, daily returns during the four months from May 1 
to August 31, and market value to deflate earnings on first trading day of May in year t or 
on the day before announcement date, are collected from the database of Taiwan 
Economic Journal (TEJ) for the A-share firms listed in SZSE and SHSE during the four 
years from 1996 to 1999. In the TEJ database, market value on day t is defined as the 
product of close price on that day and the number of outstanding shares. Interim report 
announcement dates, annual report announcement dates, auditing of interim reports, 
underlying reasons for auditing, and audit opinions are all hand collected from financial 
reports released in Shenzhen Securities Times and Shanghai Securities Daily. Since not 
all annual reports are announced until four months after the fiscal year end, the data of 
1999 annual reports are not included. 
As shown in Table 2，among the 2,834 total firm years in TEJ, 8 firm years have 
earnings data missing, 309 with prices to calculate 4-month cumulative return missing, 
, 316 with announcement date missing, 163 with returns to compound 3-day 
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CAR^ missing, and 391 with market value to deflate earnings missing. The final sample 
consists of2,330 and 1,328 firm years for long-term and event studies, respectively. 
As shown in Panel C of Table 2，among the total 2,330 firm years, 741 are 
audited, accounting for about one third of the total observations. 611 interim reports are 
audited for statutory reasons, leaving 130 reports voluntarily audited. Panel D and Panel 
E report the univariate analysis of EARN^'^ and by classes of d^EARN '^^  by classes of 
auditing reasons. By F and Chi-Square statistics, the mean and median EARN^ ^ or 
AG4题 1 6 are significantly different among audit reasons. 
Table 3 describes the distribution of announcement dates of interim reports. 
Overall, firms tend to release their interim reports late. Nearly 85% interim reports 
concentrate in the second month of the statutory period, and over half of them are 
disclosed in the last two weeks. In Table 4, reporting lag is defined as the number of days 
between announcement date and June 30. There exists significant association between 
earnings performance and reporting lag. By F and Chi-Square tests, it is significant in 
Panel A that the mean (median) ^JEARN '^^  decreases with the increase of reporting lag. 
Panel B reveals that report lags of good news firms are significantly shorter than that of 
bad news firms. Finally, in Panel C, the reporting lag of profitable firms is significantly 
shorter than that of loss firms. In sum, good news arrives earlier compared to bad news, 
and profitable firms announce their interim reports significantly earlier than loss firms. 
Table 5 reports descriptive statistics of regression variables. The mean interim 
earnings are around 0.010. The mean dJEARN^'^ is -0.000 for the regression of CAR' on 
AEARN “ and 0.001 for the regression of CAR"^ on AEARN^'^. For the full sample, the 
mean 4-month cumulative market-adjusted return (RET) is 0.003 and the mean 3-day 
CAR! around interim announcement date is -0.002. The earnings variables are deflated 
by corresponding deflators in each regression. 
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6. Empirical results 
6,1 Interim Report Informativeness 
As shown in Panel A of Table 6，four-month market-adjusted aggregate return 
and interim earnings are significantly positively correlated, for both the full sample and 
yearly sub-samples. For the full sample, the earnings response coefficient is 5.546 and 
significant at the 1% level. Similar pattern is demonstrated in yearly results. The 
explanatory power of the model is high relative to that in mature markets, possibly due to 
the lack of pre-disclosure information. For the full sample, the adjusted of the 
regression of the long-term return-earnings association is 13.4, and that for the 1996 sub-
sample reaches 40%. The finding is consistent with the results in Haw, Qi and Wu [1999] 
for annual earnings in the Chinese market. 
Results of event study are shown in Panel B of Table 6. Around the interim 
V：-
announcement date, 3-day cumulathie abnormal rate of returns (CAR^) responds 
一 significantly to the change of earnings. The ERCs vary from 0.804 to 1.755 for the full 
sample and the annual sub-samples. They are all significant at 1% level, except for the 
ERC of 1997, which is significant at 5% level. For the full sample, the explanatory power 
of the regression is 6.3%. The ERC and the explanatory power for event studies are 
smaller than that for long-term association regressions. These results are also consistent 
with Haw, Qi and Wu [1999] for annual earnings. 
Table 7 reports sensitivity analysis for the nature of news and the timeliness of 
release. The results are robust for good-news or bad-news firms, and for profitable or loss 
firms. In Panel A，3-day CAR^ responds significantly to both good and bad news. In 
I 
Panel B, 3-day CAR! is correlated significantly positively with earnings for both 
profitable and loss firms. In Panel C, the results also hold for different timing groups. 
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Figure 1 graphs CAR! in the (-10，+10) window around announcement date by the nature 
of news. It climbs up gradually for good news firms while falls down for bad news firms, 
in all the periods before, during and after interim armouncements. 
6.2 Market Response to Interim Earnings at Annual Earnings 
Announcment 
... 
Table 8 reports empirical results on whether the market reacts to interim 
earnings again at the time of annual report release by comparing different expectation 
models. Panel A first examines whether annual earnings as a whole are usefiil to 
investors. For the fuU sample, the coefficient of SEARN'-'"-{UE') is 0.251 and 
significantly positive at the 1% level. The adjusted R^ of the regression is 2%. The results 
are consistent with Haw, Qi and Wu [1999], who report that the market reacts to annual 
earnings release. Panel B disaggregates change of annual earnings into two half-year 
earnings. Earnings information for the first half year has been released before, and is 
therefore stale to investors at annual report release. P � t h e coefficient of ^EARN^'^, is 
significant for neither the full sample or any sample year. This evidence shows that the 
market does not respond significantly to first half-year earnings again at annul report 
release. On the contrary, earnings information in the second half year is new to investors 
when announced. This is evidenced by the fact that p ” the coefficient of 
^EARN'''^^ {UE^ )，is significantly positive at the 1% level for both the foil and each of 
the sample years, ranging from 0.195 to 0.568. Meanwhile, disaggregating annual 
earnings increases the explanatory power of annual earnings. The adjusted R^ of the 
‘regression in Panel B is 3.2% for the full sample, 6% and 1.3% for the sub-samples of 
1997 and 1998 respectively, all higher than that in Panel A. It seems that the market is 
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sophisticated enough to regard interim earnings as stale information, and the market 
reacts only to new information of 题 a n n u a l report名 
The comparison of Panel A, B and C in Table 8 reveals whether interim earnings 
are useful and which forecast model is the best for annual earnings. The earnings 
response coefficients UE^ and UE'mq all significantly positive, indicating that investors 
use the interim information to forecast annual earnings. The adjusted R^ and ERC are 
relatively low for UE\ possibly due to estimation errors under seasonal variation of 
earnings. Regression with UE^ as explanatory variable provides the highest ERC (0.353) 
and adjusted R^ (3.2%) among the three models, showing UE^ is the best expectation 
model for unexpected annual earnings at annual earning announcements. In sum, at 
annual report release, information of EARN '^^  has been incorporated into forecasts of 
annual earnings, which indicates that interim report is useful to investors. 
6.3 Auditing and Information Content of Interim Report 
Does auditing enhance the information content of interim report? Table 9, 
especially for long-term regression, shows that investors rely more on audited interim 
reports. For the long-term regression in Panel A, the ERC for the full sample is 4.931 and 
significantly positive at the 1% level. It is significantly positive for each of the sample 
years, too. The coefficient of the interaction term between earnings and DA,久，is 1.474 
and significantly positive at the 5% level For the sample years of 1996，1997 and 1998, 
is also significantly positive at conventional levels. Panel B reports event study 
results. The ERC is 1.408 for the full sample, significantly positive at the 1% level. It is 
also significantly positive for the annual sub-samples except for 1997. p � i s ignificantly 
positive for the sample years of 1997 and 1998. In Table 9, including DA increases the 
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explanatory power of regressions as compared to results in Table 6. For example, the 
explanatory power for the full sample in Panel A of Table 9 is 14.6%, compared to 13.4% 
in Panel A of Table 6. The results for annual sub-samples are similar. 
In Table 10，voluntary and mandatory auditing are examined separately to 
control for different motivations for auditing. The explanatory power of regressions in 
Table 10 increases compared to that in Table 9. For example, for the full sample, the 
explanatory power of long-term regression increases from 14.6% in Panel A of Table 9 to 
15.3% in Panel A of Table 10. The explanatory power of event study increases from 
6.1% in Panel B of Table 9 to 6.3% in Panel B of Table 10. The ERCs of the full sample 
and annual sub-samples remain quantitatively the same with those in Table 9，although 
the t-values are slightly different. The coefficient of the interaction term between 
earnings and VDA is significantly positive except for the sample year of 1999 in both 
Panel A and Panel B. The coefficient of the interaction term between earnings and MDA 
is not consistently significant, and the signs of these coefficients are mixed. These results 
indicate that there is significantly positive market response for voluntary but not for 
mandatory auditing. As shown in the statistics in Panel D and E of Table 2, voluntary 
auditing on average signals good news. On the contrary, cases of good (such as rights 
offer or dividends) and bad (such as special treatment) news are mixed for mandatory 
auditing, which might offset the statistical significance of price responses. 
Table 11 and Table 12 show long-term association and event study results where 
mandatory auditing is further disentangled by good or bad news. This further increases 
the explanation power of regressions. For the foil sample, the explanatory power of long-
term regression model increases from 15.3% in Panel A of Table 10 to 18.2% in Table 
11, and the explanatory power of event study regression model increases from 6.3% in 
Panel B of Table 10 to 6.7% in Table 12. The coefficients of earnings and the coefficients 
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of the interaction terms between earnings and VDA remain consistent with those in Table 
9 and Table 10. Auditing reasons signaling good news (e.g. rights offer，transfer profits to 
capital surplus, dividends) exhibit significantly positive coefficient of the interaction term 
between earnings and DA^  in most cases. For example, J3, is significantly positive in 
Table 11, ranging from 4.230 to 28.334. In Table 12,y^, is 2.058 and significant for the 
sample year of 1997. Meanwhile, there is considerable evidence that audit reason 
signaling bad news (special treatment) results in significantly negative coefficients of the 
interaction terms between earnings and DA^. P, is significantly negative for the full 
sample and the sample year of 1999 in Table 11. A l t h o u g h i s 4.782 for the sample 
year of 1998 in Table 11，the ERC is not significant, which cannot generate empirical 
indications for tMs sample year. There is no clear evidence for the effect of DA^，because 
good and bad news are mixed in other audit reasons. 
In addition, in Table 13，p, is the coefficient of the interaction term between 
earnings variable and the dummy variable for auditing. For the long-term regression in 
Panel A, P � i s all significantly positive at the 1% level in Panel A, ranging from 5.722 to 
26.072. Li Panel B ,爲 is significantly positive for the full sample and for 1999. These 
results demonstrate that audited reports with unqualified opinion yield significantly 
higher valuation multiplier than otherwise, indicating that investors regard unqualified 
interim earnings of have higher quality. 
On the whole, there is significant empirical evidence that auditing adds to the 
credibility of interim earnings. Investors rely more on audited interim reports, especially 
those audited voluntarily. Interim reports with unqualified opinions are more reliable than 
those with modified opinions. 
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7. Conclusions 
This study provides empirical evidence that interim report contains useful 
information for the Chinese investors to make valuation decisions. I find that good news 
and profitable reports arrive to the market earlier than bad news and loss reports. Both 
long-term association and short-term event study indicate that the market responds 
significantly to interim earnings when first release. This is consistent with Haw, Qi and 
Wu [1999] and [2000]. Moreover, the market does not react to interim earnings when 
they are released again as part of annual earnings. Investors have already incorporated 
such information into their expectation of annual earnings prior to annual earnings 
release, indicating that interim report is useful. 
The CSRC requires that interim reports of firms under several circumstances to 
be audited. Nearly one-third of interim reports in the sample are audited compulsorily or 
voluntarily. Evidence shows that investors rely more on audited interim reports, 
especially those audited voluntarily. Interim reports with unqualified opinions are more 
credible than those with modified opinions. This is consistent with prior evidence that 
auditing adds to the credibility of earnings (Teoh and Wong [1993]). 
In summary, this study enriches the literature on the Chinese capital market and 
provides evidence on the efficiency of the Chinese capital market by examining the 
information content of interim report in the China's A-share market. It finds that part of 
information content of annual earnings is pre-empted by interim report. For investors in 
the Chinese capital market, where little pre-disclosure information is available, interim 
report is useful in forecasting annual earnings and therefore reducing risks. This study 
also documents that auditing enhances the information content of interim data，although 
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Table 1. Development of the Chinese Stock Market 
Panel A. Number of Listed Firms in China Stock Market (A share and B share) 
— Year SHSE SZSE Total 
— 1991 8 5 13 
一 1992 29 23 52 — 
1993 105 76 181 
— 1994 171 120 291 — 
, 1995 188 135 323 — 
— 1996 293 237 530 
一 1997 383 362 745 
— 1998 438 413 851 — 
— 1999 490 459 949 一 
Panel B. Market Capitalization of China Stock Market (in billion Yuan) 
— Year SHSE SZSE Total 
— 1991 — 2 . 9 — 8 10.9 
~ 1992 71.5 49 120.5 ~ 
— 1993 218.8 133.5 352.3 
— 1994 259.7 109.1 368.8 — 
— 1995 252.6 94.9 347.5 — 
— 1996 - 547.8 436.5 984.3 
— 1997 921.8 831.1 1,752.9 — 
~ ~ 1998 1,052.5 — 877.4 1,929.9 
— 1999 1,458.05 1,189.05 2,647.1 
Source: Intelligence Department of Security Times; CSRC web page (www, csrc.2ov.cn): 
SSE web page {www.sse. com, cn) 
SHSE: Shanghai Stock Exchange 




Table 2. Sample Selection and Description 
Panel A. Sample Selection 
Sample Selection ^  
Total firm years covered by TEJ Database, from 1996 to 1999 2834 
Less: 
Firm-years with interim earnings missing (8) 
Firm-years with prices to calculate RET missing (309) 
Firm-years with market value to adjust for earning missing (187) 
Final firm years in Long-term Association Study 2330 
Less: 
Firm-years with announcement date missing (316) 
Firm-years with prices to calculate 3-day CAR missing (163) 
Firm-years with market value to adjust for earning missing (204) 
Firm-years with change of earnings for 1996 missing (319) 
Final firm-years in the Event Study 1328 
Panel B. Sample Distribution By Year and By Stock Exchange 
Y96 Y97 Y98 Y99 Total 
SHSE 185 295 366 365 1211 
SZSE 134 269 355 361 1119 
Total 319 ^ IJA 126 2330 
Panel C. Description of Audit Variable 
Full Sample 1996 1997 1998 1999 
No. of Audited (modified opinion) 741 (90) 52 258 188 243 
Voluntary Auditing (modified opinion) 130 (6) 12 32 33 53 
Mandatory Auditing (modified opinion) 611 (84) 40 226 155 190 
Cash Dividends (modified opinion) 23 (0) 0 8 2 13 
Other (modified opinion) 90 (20) 11 35 27 17 
Rights offer (modified opinion) 309 (10) 27 103 91 88 
Stock Dividends (modified opinion) 77 (5) 2 24 20 31 
Special Treatment (modified opinion) 65 (45) 0 40 2 23 
Transfer to Capital Surplus (modified opinion) 47 ^ 0 16 13 18 
Modified opinion in the sample includes qualified opinion, no opinion, and audit opinion with explanatory paragraphs. 
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Table 2. Sample Selection and Description -Continued 
Panel D. Univariate Analysis of EARN^'^ by Audit Reasons 
Classification Reason N Mean QI Median Q3  
VDA Voluntary 130 0.016 0.010 0.014 0.019 
Cash Dividends 23 0.014 0.010 0.014 0.019 
OA Right? offer 309 0.015 0.012 0.016 0.018 
1 Stock Dividends 77 0.019 0.012 0.016 0.024 
Transfer to Capital Surplus 47 0.022 0.016 0.021 0.029 
..D為 Special Treatment 65 -0.003 -0.038 -0.009 0.001 
乂3 Other Mandatory Reasons 90 0.009 0.007 0.013 0.022 
F二30.250***，CHISQ=158.28***  
Panel E. Univariate Analysis of AEARNH by Audit Reasons 
Classification Reason N Mean QI Median Q3  
VDA Voluntary 1 3 0 - 0 . 0 1 5 0.002 0 . 0 0 6 ~ 
Cash Dividends 23 0.001 -0.003 0.001 0.006 
DA^ Rights offer 309 0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.005 
Stock Dividends 77 0.008 0.001 0.007 0.012 
Transfer to Capital Surplus 47 0.010 0.006 0.012 0.014 
DA! Special Treatment 65 -0.015 -0.019 0.000 0.016 




Table 3. Distribution of Announcement Dates 
Report Date Full Sample Percentage of Announcements (%) 
7 / 1 - 7 / 1 5 7 0.53 0.53 
7/16-7/31 208 15.66 16.19 
8/1-8/15 409 30.80 46.99 
8/16-8/31 703 52.94 99.93 
9/1-9/15 1 0.07 100.00 
Total 1328 100.00 
* 
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Table 4. Association between Timeliness and Earnings News 
Panel A. Earnings by Report lag 
Report No. of Mean Median No. of Mean Median 
Date Obs. EARN'~^ EARN''' Obs AEARN ‘一‘ AEARN''' 
7/1-7/15 7 0.014 0.015 7 0.005 0.007 
7/16-7/31 208 0.012 0.012 208 0.002 0.002 
8/1-8/15 409 0.011 0.011 409 0.001 0.001 
8/16-8/31 703 0.009 0.011 703 -0.001 -0.000 
9/1-9/15 1 -0.032 -0.032 1 0.001 -0.001 
Test F=9 77g*** ChiSQ=15.617*** F=4.516***; ChiSQ=13.503*** 
•• statistics • 
Panel B. Report lag by Good-news or Bad-news 
Direction of �EARN No. of Obs. Mean RL Announcement-Date 
‘ ^！ Median ^ 
Good-news 1-6 >0) 741 44.278 8/5 8/15 8/23 
Bad-News(A£.4i?A^'"' <0) 587 46.802 8/10 8/18 8/25 
Test Statistics F二16.670***, ChiSQ=12.854***  
Panel C. Report lag by Profitable or Loss Firms 
Direction of EARN “ No. of Obs. Mean RL Announcement-Date 
~ Median ^ 
二 1215 44.759 8/6 • 8/22 -
二 = < 0 ) 113 52.221 8/18 8/25 8/28 
Test Statistics F=47.02Q***, ChiSQ=55.705***  
RL (Report Lag) is defined as the number of days between announcement date and June 30. 
41 
Table 5. Descriptive Statistics for Regression Variables 
Panel A. Statistics for Regression Variables in the Long-term Association Test 
Percentiles 
N Mean Std Dev. Skewness ^ ^  
服 2330 0.003 0.240 1.576 -0.148 -0.046 0.099 
EARN''^ 2330 0.010 0.016 -1.002 0.005 0.011 0.017 
Panel B. Statistics for Regression Variables in the Event Study 
Percentiles  
N Mean Std. Dev. Skewness 25% ^T^o 
CjIR! 1328 -0.002 0.091 1.461 -0.054 -0.008 0.037 
AEARN^'^ 1328 -0.000 0.010 -1.084 -0.004 0.001 0.005 
Panel C. Statistics for Regression Variables in the Test of Market Sophistication 
Percentiles 1 i 
N Mean Std. Dev. Skewness ^ ^ ^ ^ ：^^ 
C从‘4 996 -0.003 0.055 0.055 -0.037 -0.004 0.029 
996 0.001 0.012 -2.485 -0.004 0.001 0.006 
U^i 996 -0.001 0.032 -2.760 -0.006 0.002 0.010 
996 -0.001 0.028 -2.149 -0.006 0.001 0.007 
聰 3 996 -0.003 0.033 2.840 -0.014 -0.001 0.007 
Ret : 4-month market-adjusted rate of returns beginning from May 1 to August 31，adjusted for dividends and stock rights. 
CARI : 3-day market-adjusted cumulative abnormal rate of returns surrounding the interim report announcement date, adjusted 
for dividends and stock rights. 
CAR'^ : 3-day market-adjusted cumulative abnormal rate of returns surrounding the annual report announcement date, adjusted for ‘ 
dividends and stock rights. 
Earn 丨一6 ： earnings of the first half fiscal year contained in interim report, deflated by corresponding deflator in the regression. 
A EARN 1-6 = EARN]'^ 一 EARN)::，deflated by corresponding deflator in the regression. 
他=EARNt - EARN=AEARN , deflated by the market value at the beginning of the 3-day event window surrounding 
the annual report announcement date. 
咏 2 二 earn” -(EARN：：^ +AEARN”) = AEAm” - AEARN；-' = AEARN , deflated by the market value at the 
beginning of the 3-day event window surrounding the annual report announcement date. 
处、 e a r n ] ' ' " - -EARN]'^ + M•^题/I—/ 五义题/if)，deflated by the market value at the beginning of the 3-day event 




Table 6. Long-term Association and Event Study for Interim Report 
Panel A. Long-term Association Test 
RET = P.EARN'-^ +s 
仅 0 F-value Adj N 
“ ‘ ^  
Full sample -0.055 5.546 360.517 0.134 2330 
(-9.992)*** (18.987)*** *•* 
1996 -0.158 10.251 212.782 0.400 319 
(-8.112)*** (14.587)*** *** 
1997 -0.064 8.246 103.298 0.154 564 
. (-5.762)*** (10.164)*** *** 
1998 -0.019 2.869 24.386 0.032 721 
(-2.037)** (4.938)*** *** 
1999 -0.054 3.764 74.685 0.092 726 
(-6.247)*** (8.642)*** *** 
Panel B. Event Study 
CAR' = a�+ j3,AEARN'-' +s 
^ ^ F Value Adj N  
^  
Full Sample -0.002 L434 89.839 
(1.439) (9.478)*** *** 
1997 -0.006 0.804 5.153 0.012 350 
(-1.913)* (2.270)** 
1998 -0.001 1.598 50.365 0.101 443 
— (-0.045) (7.097)*** *** 
1999 0.000 1.755 54.158 0.091 535 
(0.092) (7.359)*** *** 
Ret : 4-month market-adjusted rate of returns beginning from May 1 to August 31, adjusted for dividends and stock rights. 
Earn : earnings of the first half fiscal year contained in interim report, deflated by the market value at the beginning of May 
in year t. 
CARI : 3-day market-adjusted cumulative abnormal rate of returns surrounding the interim report announcement date, adjusted 
for dividends and stock rights. 
站ARM 1-6 = EARN)-�- EARN):?，deflated by the market value at the beginning of the 3-day event window surrounding the 
interim report announcement date. 




Table 7. Sensitivity Test: Event Study for Interim Report 
CAR! +s 
Panel A. Regression Results by Good and Bad News 
No. ofObs. a P Adj-R" F Value 
Good News 0.001 1.173 11.111 
(0.296) (3.333)*** *** 
Bad News -0.005 1.241 21.655 
.. (-1.752)* (4.654)*** . *** 
Panel B. Regression Results by Profitable or Loss Firms 
No. ofObs. a p Adj-R" F Value 
Profitable -0.004 1.811 89.214 
Firms “ 1 � (-2.388)** (9.445)*** *** 
Loss Firms . . . 0.006 1.100 10.991 
(0.882) (3.315)*** • *** 
Panel C. Regression Results by Report Lag 
No.ofObs. a P Adj-ie F Value 
By RL: 
7/1-7/15 7 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
7/16-7/31 -0.009 2.266 15.480 
(-2.262)*** (3.934)*** *** 
8/1-8/15 -0.003 3.276 94.495 
(-1.154) (9.721)*** • *** 
8/16-8/31 -0.001 0.826 23.681 
(-0.368) (4.866)*** •** 
9/1-9/15 1 N/A ^ N/A N/A 
CARI : 3-day market-adjusted cumulative abnormal rate of returns surrounding the interim report announcement date, adjusted 
for dividends and stock rights. 
^EARN1-6 =EARN]-' - EARN]：^ ，deflated by the market value at the beginning of the 3-day event window surrounding the 
interim report announcement date. 
^ (Report Lag) is defined as the number of days between announcement date and June 30. 
***(**)(*) The two-sided t-test is significant at the 1% (5%) (10%) level 
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參 
Table & Market Valuation of Different Unexpected Earnings Models 
Panel A Market Reaction to Aggregate Annual Earnings {UE^) 
CAR"" =a,+ y ^ i • 题 
a � F Value Adj N  
^  
Full Sample -0.003 0.251 21.227 0.020 996 
(-1.820)* (4.607)*** •** 
1997 -0.004 0.464 25.421 0.051 457 
(-1.540) (5.042)*** *** 
1998 -0.003 0.107 3.666 0.013 539 
(-1.428) (1.933)* * 
Panel B Market Reaction to Disaggregate Annual Earnings (JJE^) 
CAjRA = ap + + y g , 編 题 7-12 + 左 
~ A J2 � ^ N 
Value 尺 2 
Full Sample -0.003 -0.235 o353 17.318 ^ 
(-1.721)* (-1.626) (5.784)*** **• 
1997 -0.003 -0.220 0.568 15.606 0.060 457 
(-1.117) (-0.722) (5.586)*** *** 
1998 -0.003 -0.250 0.195 4.493 0.013 539 
(-1.529) (-1.598) (2.634)*** ** 
Panel C. Market Reaction to UE^ 
C A R ' = ao + 腿ARN”i -EARN; :} : *(1 + AEARN^-' /EARN^：；)] + g 
~o A � N  
Value 
Full Sample -0.003 0.213 16.280 ^ 
(-1.551) (4.035)*** *** 
1997 -0.003 0.174 4.415 0.007 457 
(-0.904) (2.036)** ** 
1998 -0.003 0.246 14.188 0.024 539 
(-1.342) (3.767)*** *** 
CAR ^ 3-day cumulative abnormal rate of returns surrounding the annual report announcement date. 
earn = annual earnings of year t, deflated by the market value at the beginning of the 3-day event 
window surrounding the annual report announcement date, 
M M 蕭 1-6 = earn” 一 EARN]zt，deflated by the market value at the beginning of the 3-day event window 
surrounding the annual report announcement date. 
M M 题 = earn”2 一 earn):?，deflated by the market value at the beginning of the 3-day event window 
, surrounding the annual report announcement date. 
题 7-12 = AEARN11-12 一 ， d e f l a t e d by the market value at the beginning of the 3-day event window 
surrounding the annual report announcement date. 
***(**)(*) The two-sided t-test is significant at the 1% (5%) (10%) level 
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Table 9. Regression Results with Audit Dummy Variable DA 
Panel A. Long-term Association Test with Audit Dummy Variable DA 
RET = P.EAJRN'-' + P^DA + p^EARN'-^ *DA + s 
f ^ A J2 J3 FvcilueAdJ N ~  
^  
Full -0.064 4.931 0.035 1.474 133.812 0.146 2330 
sample (-9.941)*** (13.588)*** (2.880)*** (2.431)** *** 
1996 -0.154 9.670 -0.051 3.141 72.087 0.401 319 
.. (-7.588)*** (12.541)*** (-0.705) (1.700)* *** 
； 1997 -0.058 5.171 -0.056 9.735 49.994 0.205 564 
(-4.752)*** (5.370)*** (-2.026)** (5.313)*** *** 
1998 -0.020 0.949 0.000 4.723 16.394 0.060 721 
(-1.811)* (1.303) (0.015) (3.958)*** *** 
1999 -0.063 3.453 0.034 0.689 27.401 0.099 726 
(-5.766)*** (5.643)*** (1.848)* (0.793) *** 
Panel B. Event Study with Audit Dummy Variable DA 
CAR' =a,+ /^.AEARN'-' + J3^DA + p.^EARN'-^ ""DA + e 
r ^ A J2 A F value ~  
Full -0.001 1.408 -0.003 0.088 29.722 0.061 1328 
sample (-1.480) (7.269)*** (-0.841) (0.278) *** 
1997 -0.002 0.556 -0.023 1.896 4.874 0.032 350 
(-0.572) (1.377) (-2.943)*** (2.170)** *** 
1998 -0.001 1.334 0.002 0.650 17.437 0.100 443 
(-0.419) (4.536)*** (0.374) (1.804)* *** 
1999 -0.000 2.153 0.002 -0.148 19.351 0.094 535 
(-0.073) (6.969)*** (0.348) (-1.475) *** 
枕丁 ’ 4-month market-adjusted rate of returns beginning from May 1 to August 31，adjusted for dividends and stock rights. 
^ARN 1-6: earnings of the first half fiscal year, deflated by the market value at the beginning of May in year t. 
C服1 : 3-day cumulative abnormal rate of returns surroimding the interim report announcement date, adjusted for dividends and 
stock rights. 
站ARN 卜6 = EARN] 6 — EARN，deflated by the market value at the beginning of the 3-day event window surrounding the 
interim report announcement date. 
a dummy variable that equals 1 for audited firms, and 0 otherwise 
***(**)(•) The two-sided t-test is significant at the 1% (5%) (10%) level 
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Table 10. Regression Results with VDA and MDA 
Panel A. Long-term Association Test with VDA and MDA 
RET = a, + p.EARN ''' + p^VDA + p^EARN * VDA + p,MDA + fi.EARN " *MDA + e 
^ A J2 % J. A ^ ^ ~ ^ ^  ^  
F d i - 0 . 0 6 4 4.931 -0.123 10.880 0.044 0.973 85.301 0.153 2 3 ^ 
sample (-9.983) (13.645) (-3.198) (5.113) (3.454) (1.579) *** 
木氺氺 * * * • * * * * * 
1996 .-0.154 9.670 -0.398 17.090 -0.004 0.404 46.927 0.419 319 
(-7.704) (12.733) (-2.203) (3.421) (-0.053) (0.183) *** 
* * * 氺 * * * * * * * 
1997 -0.058 5.171 -0.186 20.772 -0.051 9.082 30.696 0.206 564 
(-4.757) (5.376) (-1.909) (3.044) (-1.806) (4.862) *** 
氺氺氺 * * * * * * • * * • 氺 
1998 -0.020 0.949 -0.123 9.355 0.019 4.605 11.146 0.066 721 
(-1.816)* (1.306) (-1.862) (2.121) (0.083) (3.809) *** 
* * * * * * 
1999 -0.063 3,453 0.044 -0.651 0.035 0.734 16.436 0.096 726 
(-5.759) (5.636) (0.050) (-0.130) (1.859) (0.838) *** *** *** * 
Panel B. Event Study with VDA and MDA 
CAR , = + PAEARN 1-6 + p^VDA + p,遍RN * VDA + p,MDA + P批ARN 冬 MDA + s 
A A A A ^ ^ " " “ ^ ^ “  ^  
F u i i - 0 . 0 0 1 Lm -0.001 r ^ -0.003 -0.066 29.722 0.063 m s 
sample (-0.797) (7.277) (-0.140) (2.074) (-0.962) (-0.203) *** *** 
1997 -0.002 0.556 -0.029 5.556 -0.025 1.669 3.452 0.034 350 
(-0.501) (1.378) (-1.384) (1.700) (-3.030) (1.873)* *** 
* *** 
1998 -0.001 1.334 0.001 1.888 0.001 0.441 10.840 0.100 443 
(-0.419) (4.534) (0.172) (1.862) (0.310) (0.890) *** 
• * * * 
1999 -0.000 2.153 0.007 1.958 0.001 -1.002 12.139 0.094 535 
(-0.073) (6.700) (0.623) (1.026) (0.289) (-2.068) *** 
* * * 氺本 
蛇T: 4-month market-adjusted rate of returns beginning from May 1 to August 31，adjusted for dividends and stock rights. 
已ARN 卜6 ： earnings of the first half fiscal year, deflated by the market value at the beginning of May in year t. 
Car! : , 3-day cumulative abnormal rate of returns surrounding interim report release, adjusted for dividends and stock rights. 
^^^EARN1-6 = EARN]'^ 一 EARN二，deflated by the market value at the beginning of the 3-day event window surrounding interim 
report announcement date. 
他A (MDA): a dummy variable that equals 1 for voluntarily (compulsorily) audited firms, and 0 otherwise. 











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 13. Audit Opinion 
Panel A. Long-term Association Test with Audit Dummy Variable AO 
RET = a�+ P,EARN'-^ + P^AO + P.EAm''' ""AO + s 
a � Pi F value Adj N Correlaion 
Coefficient 1 
Full -0.020 2.432 -0.096 8.982 6 9 . 4 6 4 0 . 2 3 3 
sample (-0.721) (2.729)*** (-2.970)*** (7.337)*** *** 
1996 -0.264 -4.274 -0.242 26.072 30.194 0.671 44 0.895 
(-1.316) (-0.955) (-1.113) (5.157)*** 
1997 0.240 3.666 -0.525 23.406 59.039 0.500 175 0.729 
(3.579)*** (1.941)* (-7.127)*** (7.635)*** *** 
1998 -0.030 1.153 -0.034 7.472 14.335 0.147 233 0.826 
(-0.689) (0.640) (-0.686) (3.281)*** *** 
1999 -0.069 1.998 -0.017 5.722 12.781 0.137 224 0.735 
(-1.640) (1.742)* (-0.337) (2.850)*** *** • 
Panel B. Event Study with Audit Dummy Variable AO 
CARi =«0+ /^AEARNH + P^AO + p^isEARN''' *AO + s 
(2� Pi F value Adj N Correlaion j 
Coefficient ； 
Fuii -0.001 0.662 -0.006 15.012 0 . 0 8 5 4 2 4 ‘ 
sample (-0.136) (1.728)* (-0.679) (3.098)* 
1997 0.240 -9.392 -0.267 11.908 3.652 0.068 111 0.907 
(0.944) (-0.836) (-1.043) (1.057) ** 
1998 -0.003 1.382 0.003 0.869 10.354 0.146 165 0.826 
(-0.267) (2.061)** (0.214) (1.078) *** 
1999 -0.000 0.379 -0.001 2.474 6.940 0.093 148 0.602 
(-0.021) (0.793) (-0.050) (3.102)*** *** 
RET : 4-month market-adjusted rate of returns beginning from May 1 to August 31，adjusted for dividends and stock rights. 
EARN ： earnings of the first half fiscal year, deflated by the market value at the beginning of May in year t. 
CAR!: 3-day market-adjusted abnormal rate of returns surrounding the interim report announcement date, adjusted for dividends 
and stock rights. 
組ARN�-�=EARN] ^ - EARN�二’ deflated by the market value at the beginning of the 3-day event window surrounding the 
interim report announcement date. 
AO a dummy variable that equals 1 for unqualified opinion, and 0 for modified opinions. 
***(**)(*) The two-sided t-test is significant at the 1% (5%) (10%) level 
‘Correlation coefficient of EARN“ and EARN''^ * AO 
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